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Abstract
Soft power, a term coined by American scholar Joseph S. Nye in the early
nineties, has been widely used in the academic and political arenas. This paper
attempts to analyze soft power from Chinese perspectives. By thoroughly
examining official documents, scholarly writings, news reports, and various
related websites, I hope to address the following questions: how do Chinese
scholars interpret soft power? What is soft power with Chinese characteristics?
How does China wield its soft power? What is the importance of soft power?
What are the results of Chinese soft power building? And finally, is it a zero-sum
game competing with U.S. soft power building?
My study reveals that Chinese scholars have a broader interpretation of
soft power that goes beyond Nye’s discussion on soft power. Soft power in
Chinese discourse focuses more on China’s domestic situation. Following
Chinese scholars’ discussion on soft power, Chinese politicians used culture as
the main source of Chinese soft power building. Confucianism has resurged as a
primary feature for Chinese culture exporting. The Chinese government has put a
great deal of effort into exporting Chinese culture through Confucius Institutes
worldwide and through various Chinese cultural events. By comparing results of
U.S. and China soft power projection, I reached the conclusion that even though
China has been aggressive in soft power projection, there are limitations because
of its political system, while the U.S.’s popular culture still plays a dominant role
worldwide. Both countries feel threatened by each other. Soft power projection,
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however, is not a zero-sum game but a good way to increase mutual
understanding in order to avoid future value clashes and conflicts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, references to the term “soft power” have become
widespread in China, and people who study Chinese politics and international
relations have written about soft power and its related concepts. Soft power,
coined by American scholar Joseph S. Nye in the early nineties, has been widely
used in the academic and political arenas. According to Nye, the power a state
exercises can be divided into two categories: hard power, referring to military and
economic power; and soft power, indicating the ability to achieve goals through
attraction rather than coercion.
Especially since Chinese leaders announced the idea of China’s peaceful
rise in 2003, Chinese intellectuals have given a great deal of attention to China’s
soft power projection worldwide. A number of papers about soft power can be
found in Chinese journals and newspapers, but there is no consensus among
Chinese scholars on their definition of soft power.
The purpose of my project is to examine the overall understanding of soft
power among Chinese scholars, politicians, and the public; the projection or
implementation of soft power; and the results of China’s soft power projection in
recent years. This paper poses several research questions. A good starting point is
to understand how Chinese scholars interpret soft power. The paper presents how
Chinese scholars and politicians discuss the concept, and how well the public
accepts the idea. How is it different from Nye’s definition of soft power? What is
soft power with Chinese characteristics? What is the rationale for this attention to
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soft power? How does China wield its soft power? What is the role of culture in
public diplomacy? How is China exporting its soft power? How effective is
China’s cultural soft power projection? Is it a zero-sum game competing with the
U.S. to increase China’s influence, or is the objective to build better
understanding and communication worldwide?

Methodology
Methodologically, most comments and analyses are collected from
prominent journal articles written by scholars. Other sources include media
reports, newspaper articles, government officials’ speeches and scholars’ lectures.
The first section briefly introduces Joseph Nye’s definition of soft power and
Chinese scholars’ discussions of soft power. The second section discusses
Chinese cultural soft power and a variety of sources for China’s cultural
diplomacy. The third section examines the Chinese government’s increasing
attention to soft power and the role of culture in public diplomacy. Given the
above analysis, the next section points out the importance of soft power in China.
The fifth section briefly examines the history of Confucianism, which is central to
Chinese definitions of soft power, and uses Confucius Institutes as a case study to
provide a concrete analysis China’s soft power projection. The last section
evaluates the effectiveness of China’s soft power projection by comparing it with
the U.S’s soft power. The conclusion sums up the previous ideas and discusses
their potential implications for China, the United States and the world.
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Chapter 2
Soft Power in China
Chinese scholars’ discussion on soft power
The term “soft power,” coined by Joseph S. Nye in his book Bound to
Lead in the early nineties, has been widely used in the academic and political
arenas. In his following book published in 2004, Nye polished the definition of
soft power as comprised of three factors: culture, ideology and values, and foreign
policy. According to Nye, the power a state exercises can be divided into two
categories: hard power, referring to military and economic power; and soft power,
indicating the ability to achieve power through attraction rather than coercion.
Shortly after Joseph Nye’s book Bound to Lead was introduced to China in 1992,
former president Jiang Zemin’s chief advisor, also a former professor at Shanghai
Fudan University, Wang Huning, stressed the need of strengthening Chinese soft
power with a focus on culture, saying “if a country has an admirable culture and
ideological system, other countries will tend to follow it…. It does not have to use
its hard power which is expensive and less efficient” (Wang, 1993, p. 91). Many
sociologists and philosophers in China embraced this idea and started to pay
attention to the concept of soft power. In initial discussions, Chinese scholars
mainly introduced and evaluated Joseph Nye’s definition of soft power. In 1997, a
professor at Nankai University, Pang Zhongying, published an article in Strategy
and Management discussing soft power in greater detail. More and more scholars
joined the discussion of soft power. Shen Jiru (1999), a prominent American
specialist, also called for strengthening China’s soft power.
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It was not until 2003, when the government delivered the idea of China’s
peaceful rise, that the discussion on soft power became more complex. A number
of papers about soft power appeared in Chinese journals and newspapers, but
there was no consensus among Chinese scholars on the definition of soft power.
In his earlier books, Nye focuses the discussion of soft power on popular
culture and political models, and on strategically combining hard power and soft
power (known as “smart power”), aiming to improve international standing and
further expand U.S. values and assimilate other cultures. Chinese scholars, on the
other hand, concentrate on developing soft power for different purposes, which
are to benefit economic development, to counter the negative impressions of
China, to create a beneficial international environment for China’s peaceful rise,
and to persuade others to understand and welcome China’s development through
exporting its traditional culture (Zheng, and Zhang, 2007). Cultural power and
political power are the two factors in soft power projection. Some scholars believe
that culture is the soul of a country and it permeates into all fields in the society,
while others argue that political power plays a decisive role in soft power
projection and becomes the most important factor in soft power projection. With
respect to the Chinese approach to soft power, some scholars emphasize national
development strategy and stress institutional reforms, while others concentrate on
foreign policy making to support China’s rise as a global power. Both are
necessary from a Chinese perspective: “The Chinese approach to soft power is
holistic: the domestic and foreign policy aspects of soft-power development are
conceived as an organic whole” (Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p. 20). China is

9
focusing on developing economics and building a “harmonious” society through
internal institutional reforms and calling for harmonious development externally.
Based on Nye’s definition and China’s situation in East Asia, Chen Xiansi
(2006) gave a broader interpretation of soft power. This broader concept of soft
power, including culture, diplomacy, multinational organizations, overseas
investments, tariff reduction, foreign student exchanges, and foreign aid, is used
by China and other countries.
According to Glaser and Murphy (2009), the discussions became more
sophisticated as scholars started to analyze soft power in the context of China’s
current society with China’s peaceful rise and development, which also can be
termed as “soft power with Chinese characteristics.” To differentiate Chinese soft
power from American soft power, Pang Zhongying (1997) wrote that the structure
and content of soft power vary because of diverse traditions, different civilizations,
and various developing paths of countries. He added that Nye’s definition of soft
power is a limited one based on American experiences. If China follows Nye’s
model to assimilate others into Chinese culture, using the Chinese development
model and socialist values, it will lead to power competition between the U.S. and
China, and will work against China’s wish for a peaceful development
environment. Thus, finding China’s own soft power projection model becomes
very important (Cao, 2010). This captured the attention of the government as well
as the general public. Communist Party of China Central Party School professor
Men Honghua (2007) pointed out that China’s soft power discussion should be
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enriched with Chinese practices, which will be further explained in the discussion
below on cultural diplomacy.
Joseph Nye downplayed China’s ability to develop its soft power. He
argued that because of an immature cultural industry and lack of intellectual
freedom and political corruption, China’s soft power, despite being culturally
attractive, could not be effectively projected as compared to the U.S and Europe
(Cho and Jong, 2008). He changed his attitude just a year later. In an article
published in The Wall Street Journal Asia in 2005, he cited examples of the U.S.’s
absence from the East Asian Summit, and disregarded favorable public polling to
the U.S., China’s first winner Nobel Prize for Literature Gao Xingjian, Chinese
basketball star Yao Ming, and the establishment of Confucius Institutes. In doing
so, Nye claimed that soft power development is a zero-sum game; thus, the U.S.
government should give more attention to it (Nye, 2005). This aroused debates
among scholars in China. Many saw Nye’s statement as a “soft power” version of
“China threat theory.” In response to China’s surging economy and military
buildup, according to some Chinese observers, the U.S. was intending to constrain
China’s development and maintain American’s hegemony in the world (Zhang,
2006).

Cultural diplomacy
Culture is seen as an important source of soft power projection. Milton C.
Cummings, American political scientist and author, defines cultural diplomacy as
“the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other
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aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”
(Cummings, 2003, p. 1). This cultural exchange can take place in various fields
including art, sports, literature, music, science and the economy. Such exchange
bridges mutual understanding and reduces stereotypes, which leads to better
communication and respect between the cultures involved. The potential is to
enable improved interaction and cooperation. Cultural diplomacy aims to achieve
long-term benefits, for instance, promoting national interests, building
relationships, enhancing socio-cultural understanding, and promoting trade and
foreign investments.
Cummings’ definition of cultural diplomacy stresses the exchange of ideas
and culture. However, other scholars define cultural diplomacy as the influence of
one country on another. Cultural exchange is seen as a platform to achieve
national and political purposes.
There are many approaches through which a country can build up soft
power. These include news and radio channels, satellite TV, the internet, book
publishing, cultural events and performance, worldwide events like the Olympic
games, Chinese learning institutes, students’ and experts’ exchanges, academic
communication, and tourism (Shen, 2006).
Some scholars found that soft power and hard power are closely related
and a clear division is impossible in the actual exercise of power. Zhang Lidong
(2003) claimed that hard power is the main approach of power display. Though
soft power has become more important, hard power is the foundation of soft
power. Wang Huning (1994) also pointed out that developing countries are still
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weak in terms of soft power projection, but with the development of political,
economic and technical powers, the power of culture and values will be enhanced.
Liu Zunyi (2004) emphasized using “appealingness” as the core of soft
power projection, corresponding with ancient Chinese philosophy of “win people
by virtue.” Du Ruiqing, the former president of Xi’an International Studies
University, said,
Culture is a soft power that effectively penetrates to quench
misunderstanding and hostility between people of different races. Once the
world’s people come to know about the Chinese people better they will
find out that harmony is an essential part of Chinese tradition and a
country that values harmony poses absolutely no threat to the rest of the
world. (“China threat,” 2006)
A scholar named Gao Zhanxiang concluded that cultural power is the core of soft
power in his book published in 2007.
The current minister of culture, Cai Wu, brought up the same idea when he
described Chinese culture in his speech at Wilson Center in 2011: “Culture in
Chinese history has long being compared to water, which are both gentle and
nourishing. It is compared to spring rain at night, quietly nourishing everything
from human souls to society to the whole world.”
In Cai’s view, China’s ancient history and traditional culture are precious
assets to attract not only neighboring countries with which they share Confucian
heritage but also countries around the world. Holding the belief that “the core of
soft power is culture,” Yu Xintian, director emeritus of the Shanghai Institute of
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International Studies (SIIS), wrote that “the more fashionable the ideology, the
more people will accept it and the greater the possibility to build the country’s
soft power” (Yu, 2008, p. 16). He believes contemporary Chinese culture reflects
Chinese traditional values as well as Marxism, socialism, and well-accepted
western values on technology and education (Yu, 2008).
There has been a deficit in cultural trade between China and the U.S.,
according to some Chinese scholars: “For instance, in 2004, China imported 4,068
categories of books from the U.S. and exported only 14. In 2005, in the
intellectual property rights trade with the U.S., the ratio of import and export was
4,000:24” (Li, 2008, p. 15). Many intellectuals acknowledged that the weakness
of China’s soft power is most evident in China’s export of cultural products and
the relatively weak influence of China’s mass media in the international arena.
Given the enormous attention from the government on soft power projection, the
situation began to change. Sun Jiazheng, former Chinese minister of Culture,
following the 2006 National Planning Guideline for Cultural Development,
pushed for exporting cultural products. He described the situation and identified
shortcomings of Chinese culture industry, as it started off late and lagged behind
the industry in the U.S. in terms of quantity and quality (Sun, 2006).
Festival occasions, entertaining and not politically controversial, can be
easily accepted by people. Thus, Chinese festival occasions are used worldwide to
promote understanding of Chinese culture. These include the 1999 Paris China
Culture week, the 2000 U.S. Tour of Chinese Culture, the 2001 China Festival in
Berlin, the 2002 Beijing culture week in Canada, and China year in France in
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2004 and in Russia in 2007. They usually start and end with celebrities’ speeches.
These festival events present arts exhibitions and performance with movie weeks
to showcase the uniqueness of Chinese culture. Many celebrations of Chinese
holidays and customs can be found in Latin American countries as well:
“Venezuela and China have formalized a cultural exchange program for the
period 2006-2008, including exchanges in arts, film, literature, and music”
(Glaser and Murphy, 2009).
At the same time, various organizations and institutions have held
dialogues and forums to promote soft power projection. The China Foreign
Languages Bureau organized a conference on “trans-cultural communications and
soft power building” in 2006 in Beijing, and a conference on “national soft power
construction and the development of China’s public relations” was sponsored by
the International Public Center at Fudan University in 2007. In April 2006, a
Buddhist forum in Hangzhou showed Chinese peaceful cultural heritage (Lai,
2006). This forum attracted over 1,000 Buddhist monks, experts and politicians
from 34 countries and areas. It also marked China’s use of Buddhism to showcase
its peaceful cultural lineage. One of the three topics at the forum was Buddhism's
peaceful mission to mobilize nations and religions to work for a peaceful,
prosperous and harmonious world. Liu Yandong, vice-chairwoman of the
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC), said at the opening ceremony, “Buddhism has made important
contribution to world peace and human civilization in the history. The forum will
play a positive role in exploring how Buddhism can contribute to building a
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harmonious world” (Lu, 2006, p. 3). Also, the 2008 Olympic Games, the 2010
Shanghai Expo, and the Confucius Institutes program all indicate China’s efforts
to resurge and revive itself as one of the world’s most influential countries. The
central budget for cultural undertakings reached 12.3 billion Yuan (ca. 1.9 billion
US$) in 2006, a 23.9 percent increase compared with 2005. The budget for
diplomatic spending on soft power activities in 2007 was set to rise 37.3 percent
to 23 billion Yuan (ca. 3.6 billion US$) (Li, Cheng and Wang, 2007).
China has earned 33 UNESCO World Heritage sites featuring China’s
cultural history and natural wonders, including the Great Wall, the Imperial
Palace, and Mount Huangshan, which attract foreigners worldwide (Lai, 2006).
In some countries, devotees of the martial art Tai Chi Chuan have been
meeting to exercise for over thirty years. Chinese celebrities are emerging on the
international stage. Accomplished athletes like basketball player Yao Ming and
pianist Lang Lang, and famous Kong Fu movie stars Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan
(from Hong Kong) became “cultural envoys” for China. In recent years, Chinese
movies and directors have been nominated for prestigious international awards
and Chinese designers are seen in the world’s top fashion shows. Though these
are all individual achievements, which are not directed by the Chinese
government, they deliver a new image of China to the world. For people who do
not know China, these favorable exposures are the most effective ways of
promoting China. Through cultural promoting, China hopes to assure the world
that it is a civilized, responsible and trustworthy nation (Lai, 2006). According to
Pang Zhongying, a professor of International Relations at Renmin University,
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“Officially and unofficially, the development of the nation’s soft power has been
regarded as a pressing task and is near the top of China’s list of priorities” (Pang,
2008).

Government’s focus on culture in public diplomacy
Culture and politics are closely related. “How culture interfaces with
politics is essential to human affairs,” James Leach, former Senator and head of
the National Endowment for the Humanities in the U.S., said. “If people of one
country can respect culture of another, it is more likely that any differences arisen
can be managed peacefully and constructive. One the other hand, if the mutual
respect is lacking, the likelihood of less peaceful and less constructive approach
being established is high” (Leach, 2011).
The Chinese government has an obvious focus on culture in its public
diplomacy. Alan Henrikson, a professor of diplomatic history at Tufts Fletcher
School, defines public diplomacy as
the conduct of international relations by governments through public
communications media and through dealings with a wide range of
nongovernmental

entities

(political

parties,

corporations,

trade

associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations,
ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose
of influencing the politics and actions of other governments. (Hendrikson,
2005)
Public diplomacy is one aspect of soft power projection.
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From the very beginning of Communist China’s political history, culture
and politics have been closely related. Chairman Mao, during his speech
in Yenan back in 1942, claimed that culture should serve politics:
In the world today all culture, all literature and art belong to definite
classes and are geared to definite political lines. There is in fact no
such thing as art for art’s sake; art that stands above classes or art that
is detached from or independent of politics. Proletarian literature and
art are part of the whole proletarian revolutionary cause; they are, as
Lenin said, cogs and wheels in the whole revolutionary machine.
Therefore, Party work in literature and art occupies a definite and
assigned position in Party revolutionary work as a whole and is
subordinated to the revolutionary tasks set by the Party in a given
revolutionary period. (p. 69)
As for today, China has been opened up for more than thirty years. Culture
is no longer strictly controlled and it is no longer focused on revolutionary
ideology. There has been an important shift from using culture as a tool for
political goals to accepting culture as independent from politics. A variety of arts
and literature are allowed to blossom and once criticized foreign cultures are
imported to enrich people’s lives. However, we can still feel government’s strong
hand over culture to eliminate those elements that threaten the regime. Chinese
culture is still used as propaganda by the Party.
Nye’s discussion on soft power brought people’s attention to the topic.
Building on China’s tradition of soft power projection, scholars have developed a
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deeper understanding about the importance of public diplomacy and how China
can utilize culture to build soft power. Resonating with scholars’ discussions on
soft power, government officials advocated soft power projection with a focus on
culture, implying peaceful development through attractiveness. There has been an
increase of conversations within the Party focusing on soft power. Many
foreigners consider China as a culturally unique country, of which the Chinese
government took advantage in their cultural diplomacy. The current minister of
culture, Cai Wu, noted, “Culture exchange can bridge the hearts and minds of our
people, deepen our mutual understanding and trust.” The government believes if
foreigners understand China better, they will be more accommodating of China’s
interests (Starr, 2009, p. 80).
In the political report to the 16th Chinese Communists Party (CCP)
Congress on November 8, 2002, former president Jiang Zemin pointed out, “In
today’s world, culture intertwines with politics and economics, demonstrating a
more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national
power.” Right after the 16th CPC Congress, a policy, China’s cultural system
reform, was approved to make socialist culture with Chinese characteristics,
contrary to feudalism and capitalism, a powerful attraction and inspiration not
only to the Chinese people, but to people worldwide (Glaser and Murphy, 2009).
Propaganda chief Liu Yunshan (2002) noted that the power of culture had became
an important component in international competition and building of culture was
set as a guiding principle.
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Zhao Qizheng, the former director of the State Council Information Office,
indicated in 2006 that Rome, Britain and the U.S., the three historical world
powers, did not only build on economic and military power but were also
supported by their cultural strengths. In order for this ancient civilization to
sustain its development, China should regard reviving its culture and
strengthening cultural communication with the outside world as an important task
for the nation’s destiny (Shen, 2006).
Since taking office in 2003, Hu Jintao, president of People’s Republic of
China, has been advocating for a harmonious world and China’s peaceful rise,
pursuing soft power in international relations. China could use its cultural
attractiveness to enhance its national image and counter the “China threat” theory
as well as to ease external concerns over China’s economic development. In May
2004, the CCP Politburo held its 13th collective seminar on “Development and
Prosperity of Chinese Philosophy and Social Science.” The main purpose of this
seminar was to introduce the so-called “Beijing Consensus” and attract
international attention on Chinese development. While the Washington Consensus
includes marketization, privatization, democracy and public participation, China
promotes its own state-led development model which some call the “Beijing
Consensus,” by inviting elite members from countries such as Vietnam,
Venezuela, Myanmar, North Korea and Brazil to study the Chinese model of
economic development (Kurlantzick, 2007).
The Beijing Consensus represents an alternative development model
compared to Washington Consensus of market friendly policies promoted by the
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IMF, the World Banks and the U.S. Treasury. Holding the seminar indicated that
Chinese leaders wanted to pursue Chinese soft power strategically (Yang, 2004, p.
14). The term “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) was replaced by the term “peaceful
development” (heping fazhan) by officials after 2004. President Hu Jintao also
made this clear at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on 4
January 2006: “The increase in our nation’s international status and influence will
have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and
technology, and defense, as well as in soft power such as culture” (Ma, 2007). In
the same year, Hu declared, “The one who takes commanding point on the
battlefield of cultural development will gain the upper hand in fierce international
competition” (“Hu Jintao”, 2006). Chinese leaders brought out the concept of soft
power building quite frequently. Premier Wen Jiabao also said, “We should
expand cultural exchanges with other countries. Cultural exchanges are a bridge
connecting the hearts and minds of people…an important way to project a
country’s image.”
In the 17th Party’s Congress in 2007, “National Cultural Soft Power” was
officially introduced by President Hu, who stressed the importance of upgrading
China’s soft power with cultural development, which indicates that soft power had
become the focus of China’s strategic development (“Guangming Daily”, 2007).
“Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and
creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall
national strength," said President Hu at the 17th Communist Party Congress in
2007. He tied soft power and the role of culture together and advocated for
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enhancing China’s cultural soft power (Wenhua ruanshili), which should be
achieved by cultural innovation. China aimed to develop its cultural industry,
launch major cultural projects, nurture investors, create a thriving cultural market
and enhance its international competitiveness (Bandurski, 2007). Soft power and
culture became the headlines in many newspapers in the aftermath of the 17th
Congress. Various cultural communities held discussion sessions on cultural soft
power. The China Institute on Contemporary International Relations and the
Institute of Strategic Studies of the Central Party School both conducted
comprehensive studies on soft power (Li, 2008).
In July 2007, the CPPCC National Committee held a special session on
“Cultural Construction as the Main Approach for National Soft Power Building.”
At the meeting, Jia Qinglin, CPPCC Chairman and a member of the CCP
Politburo Standing Committee, urged Chinese officials to “deeply understand the
importance of national soft power with cultural construction as the main task” in
order to both meet domestic demands and enhance China’s competitiveness in the
international arena.
The leadership’s Five-Year Plan for Cultural Development reinforced the
expansion of media and cultural related enterprises. The plan stated that
“deepening the systematic reform of the cultural sector and promote cultural
prosperity is necessary for the creation of a moderately prosperous society for the
development of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Du, n.d., p. 1). China
aims to form public opinion powers commensurate with China’s international
status.
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Party’s propaganda chief, Liu Yunshan, aiming to push “cultural industry
development,” toured Henan province and noted,
The first 20 years of this century are a key strategic period in China’s
modernization process and also a key strategic period for cultural
development. We must firmly grasp this historical opportunity,
energetically promoting cultural development, working hard to achieve a
major rise in our nation’s cultural soft power. (Bandurski, 2007, p. 6)
Cultural products and activities are not only organized by the citizens but
also promoted by the government. The government realized that there is a fast
growing need for cultural products and services. During a speech at the Wilson
Center in Washington, DC, Minister of Culture Cai Wu explained in detail about
China’s approach to the peaceful projection of soft power:
The Chinese government attaches high importance to the cultural our
generation and nation, and cultural wellbeing of our people. We are
working hard, to build a nationwide network of public culture services,
boosting our culture industry encouraging innovation promoting
cultural, diversity and learning from other cultures extensively. We
uphold the principle of let hundreds of flowers blossom and hundred
schools of thought contend, and seek to the culture life of our citizens
with high quality of culture products and services. In the last three
decades of reforming and opening up, the culture of harmony has
supported China to achieve greater progress in economic growth, social
stability and ethnic solidarity, as well as the great improvement of our
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people’s living standards. When looking at China’s progress many
visionary researches have neglected, when pieced together different
dimensions of Chinese culture, we could invariably find a picture of
cultural China underneath a more apparent image of economic China.
Culture is an important powerhouse and headspring for China’s
development. In today’s China, when China adopts the concept and
approach scientific development, set up its goal of building a
harmonious society and determination of further reform and opening up.
It is Chinese culture’s commitment to harmony and our people’s
collective wills for peace that is at work. (Cai, 2011)

Chinese culture has played an important role in people’s lives, and as Cai
said, it is the powerhouse and engine to boost China’s social and economic
development. Based on the Chinese culture of harmony, Cai stressed Chinese
people’s collective will of peaceful rise and development.
In order to educate foreigners about China, the Chinese government
appropriated 45 billion Yuan (US$7 billion) in January 2007 to make over its
media, establishing Chinese TV, cable and Internet broadcasts worldwide,
promoting Chinese language learning, and actively participating in regional
multinational organizations (Meng, 2007). CCTV 9, China’s English speaking
channel with services in English, Spanish, and French, plans to open new services
in Russian and Arabic. The state-run news agency Xinhua is also planning to open
more bureaus overseas. A recent venture is CNC world, which is intended to
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compete with CNN and BBC, commenting on world major issues from Chinese
perspectives.

The importance of soft power with a focus on culture
“From the reevaluation of Chinese traditional culture and search for
a ‘socialist core value system,’ to following the ‘scientific
development concept’ and establishing a harmonious society; and the
debate over how to combat ‘China threat’ theory and establishing a
harmonious world, soft power has been a common thread” (Glaser,
and Murphy, 2009).
As we have seen, the concept of soft power has gained enormous attention
in China. Now that China has developed significant hard power, it is important to
build up its soft power in order to pave the way for further development
worldwide and to promote mutual understanding with other countries. To
summarize, soft power is important for several reasons. Soft power is seen as an
alternative approach to maintain sustainable development, to counter-balance
China’s increase in hard power, and to create a tranquil and stable international
environment that is not only favorable to China’s development, but also beneficial
to win-win cooperation, mutual trust, and equality.
First, internally, soft power building is conducive to the domestic program
of building a “harmonious society, a concept that Hu-Wen leadership proposed to
tackle mounting domestic social challenges as well as to maintain the legitimacy
of the Party” (Li, 2008).
Second, soft power is an important self-defense shield (Li, 2008). Success
in soft power projection can dispel misperception and misunderstanding held by
some foreign commentators. This also helps to improve China’s image, damaged
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by massive foreign media coverage of the protests in Tibet and the Olympic torch
relay in 2008. China needs greater soft power to gain more understanding from
people worldwide:
The Chinese culture is the only ancient human civilization that has
continued without interruption. It reflects Chinese people’s confirm
believe in harmony and balance. “This culture is also a compassionate
culture, centered on humanity, and a set of humanitarian ethnics that ask
people to extend one’s empathy from self to others from the near to the
far. (Cai, 2011)
In the past, China was in a self-sufficient agriculture civilization. Chinese
ancestors were devoted to farming their own land. When the invaders came, their
instinct was to build the great wall to defend instead of participating in a battle.
China has never colonized any country:
Today China is always upholding its defensive policy in its national
security and will never embark on the old path of other countries in
seeking hegemony when being strong. As its economic relation with other
countries, China always adheres to peace and mutual benefits. Over 600
years ago, the great Chinese navigator Zheng He led seven maritime
expeditions to as far as Kenya in East Africa. During his maritime
expedition, he didn’t bring one single soldier forces instead he brought
with him, china, teas, silk and technology. All his voyages were
recognized as voyages of peace. (Cai, 2007)
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All these stories are told to show that China is a peaceful nation, and it will
develop with harmony and become a responsible world leader.
With China’s opening up and its growing economic power, the nation has
made great contribution to the world economy. However, in terms of western
markets and natural resources, China has become a strong competitor, which has
threatened many countries. Therefore, China needs out-of-the-box thinking and a
new strategy to further develop its economy. Soft power development with a
focus on culture, implying peaceful development through attractiveness, is the
best strategy to counter the “China threat” thesis. China aspires to higher
international status and greater international influence, which can be achieved not
only with hard power but also through harmonious soft power projection.
Third, with the defensive approaches mentioned above, China has
embarked on a policy of peaceful and sustainable development that includes
culture. “Only when a country has its influential power can it sustain national
development,” said Zhao Qizheng (Shen, 2006).
Minister Cai said,
We

understand

that

our

world

today

is

undergoing

major

transformations, adjustments, and development. As economy and political
globalization further deepen, the interactions and interdependence between
different countries have become more and increasingly intensive. There is
a universal consensus for all nations to seek peace and development
cooperation. (Cai, 2011)
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He also pointed out some challenges and threats as barriers to worldwide peaceful
development, for instance, regional conflicts, terrorism, cross border security,
financial crisis and energy, water shortage. Cai claimed, “Chinese people have
been holding high the banner of peace, development and cooperation. China, as
always, upholds a defensive policy of our national security, and will never embark
on the old path of some countries in ‘seeking hegemony when strong’” (2011).
But the global situation is not as simple as Cai suggests, and his ideals
may prove to be wishful thinking. In order to fuel China's economy, the Chinese
government needs to purchase raw materials, so sudden change of public
sentiment could easily hurt Chinese economic expansion. The destiny of countries
is bound together, so it is to China’s benefit to maintain a stable and peaceful
environment for further development: “China hopes to convey a thoughtful,
innovative, and responsible and, most importantly, peaceful friend to all nations”
(Lugar report, 2011, p. 5).
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Chapter 3
Case study: Confucius Institutes
Confucianism and soft power
Ranging an uninterrupted long history, traditional Chinese culture
became the most valuable source of Chinese soft power. A contemporary Chinese
scholar writes, “’Harmony’ stresses “giving priority to human beings”
(yirenweiben) and “Harmony between nature and humankind” (tianrenheyi)
appeals to the world in an era of cultural diversification and globalization. This
ideology also provides alternative approaches in addressing current problems,
thus putting Chinese culture in a more advantageous position in the post-industrial
information era (Li, 2008, p.10).
The concept of soft power is embedded in many ancient Chinese philosophies,
most prominently Confucianism, the tradition of thought and practice associated
with a renowned scholar Kong Fuzi. This tradition has been identified as Ru (儒).
“Ru means ‘soft,’ ‘gentle,’ ‘enduring,’ and, sometimes, ‘weak’” (De Bary, 1999,
p. 41). The doctrine of Confucius includes obedience, clemency, harmony, mercy,
beneficence, benignancy and benignity. Confucianism extols a king who relies on
moral force not physical force, believing that the kingly way (wangdao) will
triumph over the hegemon’s way (badao), emphasizing moral forces and virtue
over martial prowess.
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Criticism of Confucianism
Confucianism has influenced China for more than 2,500 years.
Confucianism emphasizes hieratical relations and education. However, the state
examination system in the late Qing dynasty, based on the Confucian classics,
lacked any flexibility. While other Asian countries opened their doors to learn
from western modernization and advanced technology, Chinese people in the
Qing dynasty were not as open to alternatives. That is one of the reasons why the
Taiping Rebellion tried to overturn this feudal ideology ofConfucianism in the
1850s and 1860s. Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China
Center at the Brookings Institute in Washington DC, told China Daily that “a lot
of Chinese people felt that the reason China became so vulnerable to aggression
from the West and from Japan was because of the Confucian system” (Chung,
2010, p. 11). Confucianism as a philosophy had been guiding China for many
years, but rigid Confucianism as the basis for the system of government became a
real problem.
During the May Fourth Movement of 1919, embracing western values of
science and democracy instead of being politically conservative, Chinese
intellectuals shouted "Down with the Confucian store!" (Mooney, 2007).
Confucianism once again became the target. However, the ideology was still
rooted deeply inside Chinese people's hearts.
Communists denounced Confucius again during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-67), mainly for the reason that Confucianism represented the past and did
not accord with revolutionary values. “The Chinese are probably the only people
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in the world who have sought to thoroughly abandon their own thought, culture,
and traditions”, said Guoxiang Peng, an associate professor at Tsinghua
University (Mooney, 2007, p. 6).

The Revival of Confucianism
Today, a century after being blamed as a barrier to China's development,
Confucianism has reentered Chinese society as a potential solution to many
current social problems (Mooney, 2007).
In early 2011, a week before President Hu Jintao’s visit to the U.S., a
giant bronze Confucius statue was placed on the east side of Tiananmen Square
by the government, which caused confusion among people because Confucianism
was once vilified by the revolutionary government. The statue was removed
without explanation a few weeks later. Books on Confucianism appeared in
bookstores. Eighteen domestic Chinese universities started to offer courses on
Confucianism or help to set up Confucius Institutes. Peking University started a
12-month program on Confucius studies for business people. A popular TV series
was offered by Beijing lecturer Yu Dan in 2006 (Starr, 2009). Ms. Yu explained
the Analects of Confucius in simple words and attracted public attention to the
topic.
This once criticized ideology now regained its status and became the
central feature for exporting culture in today’s China for the following reasons.
First, Confucius advocates mercy, loyalty, courtesy, and wisdom. It
aligns with the contemporary Chinese development model: harmony and peaceful
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development. Confucius’ ideology now is an ethical heritage that the Chinese
government wants to rejuvenate. Internally, the income gap has widened along
with China’s economic development, causing social tensions within Chinese
society. Under these circumstances, Confucianism’s advocacy of equality of
opportunity through education regardless of income level becomes very attractive
to the Chinese government to maintain a harmonious society (Starr, 2009).
Externally, because Confucianism is embedded into Chinese cultural history, it
exemplifies harmony and helps to counter the China threat theory: “Confucianism
extols a king who relies on moral force not physical force, believing that the
kindly way will triumph over the hegemon’s way” (Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p.
12), which increases China’s influence worldwide in a peaceful way.
Second, Roger Ames, professor at the University of Hawaii-Manoa,
pointed out that in order to catch up with the rapid trend of economic
development, China has moved quickly toward a free-market economy, along
with widened income gaps. Thus, few people still believe in Marxism and
Communism, leaving an ideological vacuum in the current society. Experiencing
a spiritual void, people will not have a fundamental belief system to cope with
current challenges. Books on Yu Dan’s lectures mentioned above became best
sellers in China and sold more than three million copies over four months.
“People are looking for some sort of spiritual values for everyday life” (Mooney,
2007, para.17), says Stephen C. Angle, a Fulbright scholar at Peking University
and a professor of philosophy at Wesleyan University.

32
In addition, I believe that in order to maintain China’s development in a
sustainable way, some Confucius doctrines are strongly needed in the current
society. People need to avoid being shortsighted, and to cultivate themselves for
long-term achievements. There is a collapse of morality in China's current society.
We constantly hear about irresponsible behaviors resulting in toxic baby formula,
counterfeit diplomas, shoddy infrastructure projects, etc. “Confucian principles
teach one how to be an upright person and the right way to do things,” Jiang Qing,
a retired professor, says. “No matter what you do, you need to know this”
(Mooney, 2007).
Confucianism has been considered a feudal ideology. However, just as
Zhou Youguang, a renowned scholar in Beijing has mentioned in his book
Shortcut, Confucianism contains many positive factors. There are many words of
wisdom, with long-term and wide-ranging values. Once revised and modernized,
they can still serve a post-feudal society. For instance, Confucius’ opinion on
knowledge is “being aware of what you know and what you don't know is
wisdom.” This implies, “When you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and
when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it,” and acts as a
guideline for Chinese students. His admonition on politics, “people are the
priority,” should be used as the guideline for the CCP. Confucius considers peace
as the most valuable thing, which coordinates with CCP’s goal of peaceful
development. The approach above is known as modernized Confucianism,
serving the current society (Zhou, 2011).
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Confucius presents positive associations with teaching and culture with
influence not only in China but also the broader region in Asia, for instance
Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia (Starr, 2009, p. 69). China shares the Confucian
heritage with many East Asian neighbors. Thus, it is easier for people to accept.
In the Western world, Confucius is generally associated with wisdom and ethics,
an image Lieberthal believes is greatly beneficial to China at this time of growth
and change. “It's not surprising that China would want to associate with a symbol
people identify with and respect and that they would use Confucius as a
marketing brand, if you will,” Lieberthal said.
Regarding this rehabilitation of Confucius ideology, some scholars, like
Daniel Bell, a visiting professor at Tsinghua University, pointed out that
currently, Confucianism with an emphasis on respect for authority is the best
alternative to fill the spiritual void, compared to Christian sects, Falun Gong, and
other extreme forms of popular nationalism (Mooney, 2007). However, if the
revival of Confucianism begins to threaten the Communists’ regime, it will be
once again denounced. Zhang Tianliang, professor at George Mason University,
shares the same thought. He said during his interview with VOA
thatConfucianism was denounced because it contradicted the kind of Marxism
that the Party was promoting. Now that China is opening up, the Chinese
government needs to communicate with other countries, and the ideology of
socialism certainly cannot be a media of communication. Thus, the government
has turned to Confucius. It is actually the Chinese government’s ideology
wrapped within Confucianism. Confucianism has resurged as “an appealing
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alternative to both free market economics and hardline Communism, but in large
part because it is an indigenous philosophy” (Mooney, 2007, 47). According to an
article in the Economist, “Party officials use Confucius as a Father-Christmas like
symbol of avuncular Chinese rather than as the proponent of philosophical
outlook” (“Asia: Rectification,” 2011). In spite of its philosophy, most people
believe Confucianism was chosen because of its popularity and brand recognition.
However, once Confucianism constrains the Chinese government or
contradicts government ideology, it will face denouncement once again
(“Comments on,” 2011). This also explains the reason why general discussion on
Confucianism surges but topics such as “Political Confucianism” and “Modern
Confucian Democracy” can be rarely seen (Mooney, 2007).

Introduction of the Confucius Institutes
The Confucius Institutes (CIs) are an important approach for China to
achieve its public diplomacy goals. Modeled after Germany’s Goethe Institute,
UK’s British Council, and others, the Confucius Institute program is a non-profit
public organization, overseen by Office of Chinese Language Council
International (Hanban) affiliated with Ministry of Education in China. Interested
universities must submit applications to Hanban for review. If approved, Hanban
generally provides $100,000 annually, with Chinese teachers from counterpart
Chinese university to start up the institute. All CIs tailor their activities based on
local needs, but operate in the same manner: “The mission statement is to
strengthen educational cooperation, promote the development of Chinese
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language education and increase mutual understanding” (Starr, 2009, p. 71).
According to Zheng Guanping, an appointed director for the newly
established CI at Middle Tennessee State University, the goals of CIs are to
promote Chinese language, to promote an understanding of Chinese culture, and
to promote partnerships between organizations in the U.S. and organizations in
China (Davis, 2012). The program caters to the demands of Chinese learners
worldwide and aims to increase communication between China and other nations.
The first Confucius Institute was inaugurated in Seoul, South Korea in 2004 (Lai,
2006, p. 12). The CIs are established within universities and partnered up with a
domestic university in China, whereas Confucius Classrooms are aimed at high
schools. According to the official Hanban website, by the end of 2011, there were
358 Confucius Institutes and 500 affiliated Confucius Classrooms established in
96 countries. By 2011, the number of Confucius Institutes/ Classrooms increased
24%, from 691 in 2010. Organized cultural activities increased dramatically from
7,500 in 2010 to 130,000 in 2011, and participation rose exponentially from 3
million in 2010 to almost 8 million in 2011 (Shu, 2011).
In the U.S., there has been rapid growth of Confucius Institutes. (See
Appendix I for a list of Confucius Institutes.) A variety of programs have been
established, ranging from preschool children taking a Chinese learning class in
New York City’s Confucius Institute, to learning sessions for adopted Chinese
children in Chicago, and from an online Chinese learning game devised by the
director of the CI at Michigan State University to a remote-learning class at the
University of Kansas. Liu Quanshen, director of the Confucius Institute at the
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University of Maryland, told Xinhua that many of the students at his institute are
government employees, and it is a strong indication that the Confucius Institute
has reached the mainstream society of the United States (Yang, 2008).
Additionally, the CIs offer training for Chinese teachers, administer exams and
tutoring services in Chinese, and organize Chinese competitions. Some of them
also provide consultancy services for studying in China, offer in-person
experience with Chinese culture, and provide commercial information regarding
China (Lai, 2006). The CIs also provide scholarships for students to study in
China for a year (Davis, 2012). Hanban invited more than 300 university
presidents and 2,000 directors and teachers at Confucius Institutes, to the 2010
Shanghai World Expo at Hanban’s expense (Golden, 2011).
The first Confucius Institutes conference was held in Beijing in 2006,
with the participation of over 200 representatives from 38 countries and areas (Lai,
2006). The number of participants increased to over 1000 during the second
Confucius Institutes conference. The theme for the second conference was “To
sum up the experience, to build closer corporation, to enforce management, to
improve quality, to develop Confucius Institute faster and better.” In year 2008,
the third Confucius Institute Conference was held. The theme was “Confucius
Institute and international education.” With increasing importance given by the
government to the CIs, the Confucius Institutes headquarters was established in
Beijing. Conferences were held in the headquarter annuallys, from 2009 to 2011,
and the themes were “Building Confucius Institutes and bridge mutual
understanding,” “Confucius Institutes and sustainable development,” and
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“Confucius Institutes in ten years.” Chinese government made consistent efforts
in the past decade on soft power building. Li Changchun, one of the nine
members of the Standing Committee of Politburo in charge of ideology and
propaganda, noted that Confucius Institutes are “an important channel to glorify
Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the world” (Wachter, 2007).

Challenges to Confucius Institutes
Despite CIs’ rapid growth, challenges exist. First, critics warn that the
government uses the CIs to have political control over western universities, and
they worry about academic freedom. This is actually a valid concern. Xu Lin, the
secretary-general of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, said frankly, “We only
discuss language and culture in the classroom” (Xu, 2011). Some very top
universities in the U.S., like Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania,
and Yale University are reluctant to establish of Confucius Institutes on campus.
Stanford University opened its doors to Confucius Institute, but the 4 million
dollars of initiation funds come with a caveat: “no discussion on Tibet” (Golden,
2011). June Dreyer, a professor of political science at the University of Miami,
says the institutes perform a propaganda function. David Branner, an affiliated
associate professor at Colombia University, also is concerned about those
universities becoming too dependent on Chinese funds to discuss sensitive issues
like Tibetan and Taiwanese independence. Examples can be seen worldwide.
Within the U.S., the CI at the University of Oregon once canceled a lecture by
Peng Mingmin, an advocate of Taiwan independence (Schmidt, 2010). North
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Carolina State University canceled an arranged speech by Dalai Lama, fearing it
might damage relations with China and threatens their joint programs like student
exchanges, summer research and faculty collaborations.
Nevertheless, people who are actually involved in the program reject
these fears. Michael Nylan, professor of Chinese history at the University of
California Berkeley, did an informal survey among 15 universities with Confucius
Institutes. Only two reported that they were pressured to turn away guest
speakers, and both events went on anyway (Golden, 2011). It seems that students
at the CI at University of Maryland are simply happy to gain access to the
afterschool program (Schmidt, 2010). Chuansheng Liu, director of the CI at
University of Maryland, claims that there is no pressure from the Chinese
government and its counterpart Nankai University. Mary Gallagher, professor at
the University of Michigan Ann Arbor, says the CI there is free to discuss
sensitive issues like Uighur minority, the group that clashed violently with the
Chinese government in 2009 (Schmidt, 2010). However, if we take a closer look
at the discussion, the program was on the Uighur minority in the performing arts,
rather than political issues as noted on the previous examples.
Second, people involved in the Confucius Institute are concerned more
about the sustainability of the institutes than political censorship (Starr, 2009, p.
79). Currently in the CIs, more emphasis is given to language teaching. The
government's focus on language outreach coincides with a rapidly growing
interest in Chinese language study that likely reflects a growing interest in China
itself. “Languages as carriers of culture and communication tools are bridges for
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different civilizations,” State Councilor Liu Yandong told the fourth conference
of Confucius Institutes in December 2011.
However, language teaching alone is not sustainable for future
development and expansion of CIs. When asked whether Confucius Institutes
promote the essence of Confucianism, Mr. Fu Jianzhong said language learning is
far from learning of Confucianism (“Comments on”, 2011). “My impression is
that the Chinese approach has more of an emphasis on language learning, and less
on a broader cultural or sociocultural angle than has been the case in US efforts
abroad, or Japanese or German efforts,” Lieberthal said. Language learning is not
cost effective, and although the best way to learn about a country’s culture is to
know about the language, it is still important to combine language learning with
culture and values. Interests in culture will in turn facilitate language learning.
Xu, the secretary-general of the CI Headquarters, admitted that the Confucius
Institute is still exploring a perfected and duplicable mode to effectively combine
language teaching and cultural exchange in a more approachable way for nonChinese speakers (Xu, 2011). Currently in the U.S., the Hanban sponsors research
project on Chinese issues in universities such as Columbia University, the
University of Chicago, and Stanford University. This decision on one hand shows
the diversity of the programs other than language teaching, but, on the other hand,
delivers the idea of academic flexibility to other universities.
Third, the Confucian doctrine is different from contemporary mainstream
Chinese culture, so it is not a convincing reflection of contemporary Chinese
society. For example, people in China rarely listen to the Beijing Opera, and the
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younger generation rarely practicing Kong Fu, so the influence of traditional
culture is waning. According to a study done by Egri and Ralston (2004) on
Chinese managers, younger managers hold a low opinion of Confucian values.
Traditional symbols of Chinese culture in foreigners’ eyes are no longer popular
in China. Historically, all successful cultural diplomacy required strong
cooperation between the government and its people. For instance, American
basketball as a source of U.S. cultural diplomacy is supported by a large number
of basketball enthusiasts in the U.S. Also, the Japanese government’s manga
diplomacy is sustained by its large domestic cartoon industry (Chen, 2010). In
cultural diplomacy, the government is an initiator, while the public works as fuel.
However, despite the Chinese government’s enthusiasm about Confucius
Institutes and Confucianism, the majority of the public rarely cares or responds
negatively. According to a survey in 2010 on ifeng.com, among 219 respondents,
half of them do not support Confucius Institutes, and almost 70% of them
consider this idea problematic and express concern.
In addition, while the government is pouring a huge amount of money
overseas to educate foreigners about Chinese culture, the domestic education
system is being westernized. English learning is becoming even more important.
Chinese children start their English classes as early as possible. English speaking
skills are one of the most important factors in any evaluation for study or many
jobs, whereas many people are not paying attention to traditional culture studies
and Sinology.
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Fifth, with its dramatic expansion, it is also important for CI organizers
to maintain the quality. Nealy 360 Confucius Institutes have been established in
seven years since the first one was inaugurated in Korea. Once every eight days,
one more Confucius Institute is established. Chinese people refer to this situation
as the “great leap forward” for Confucius Institutes. There is a shortage of
professional language teachers as a result. With its rapid development, the need
for Chinese language teachers will soon outpace qualified teachers who possess
licenses to teach Chinese as a second language. This depletion will damage the
plan of promoting Chinese language worldwide (Zhe, 2010). Wang Yongli,
deputy director-general of Hanban, told China Daily during an exclusive
interview that lack of directors and teachers has become the biggest challenge for
the development of Confucius Institutes (Zhang, 2011). Good teachers can make
learning more interesting and productive. The CIs need solid foundation for its
further development.

The success of the Confucius Institutes
Although China has historically encouraged awareness of its language
and culture through diplomatic outreach, teacher exchanges, and formal
education agreements, its efforts to bolster awareness of China’s language,
politics, and society have intensified during the past four years thanks to
the inauguration of university-based Confucius Institutes. (Glaser and
Murphy, 2009)
China’s Ministry of Education plans to set up 500 Confucius Institutes worldwide
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Hanban aims to establish 1,000 Confucius Institutes by 2020.
Below is a map (Figure 1) of Confucius Institutes in the United States
and their partner universities in China. In addition, the chart indicates CIs’
expansion in the U.S. from 2004 to 2011. How can we explain the rapid growth
and expansion?
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Thanks to China’s increasing economic power, Confucius Institutes have
sound financial support from the government. So far, Hanban has spent more than
$500 million on Confucius Institutes worldwide since 2004 (Golden, 2011).
Though every Confucius Institute adjusts itself to campus needs, the Chinese
government continues to give about $100,000 annually to each Confucius
Institute and also pays Chinese language instructors. This allows colleges to
provide more programs related to China (Schmidt, 2010).
Second, China is a hot topic internationally. Every Confucius Institute
establishes in partnership with a Chinese university. This partnership is attractive
because people want to have more connections with China. The world wants to
know what’s going on in China. The partner universities in China provide
language teachers and important opportunities for the exchange of students,
faculty, and staff. In addition, as mentioned before, even though people have
doubts about the Chinese government’s political purpose of estabilishing CIs,
facts show that currently CIs are operated quite freely without Chinese
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government intervention. The CIs are given considerable automony and flexibility.
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Chapter 4
Results of China’s soft power projection
World opinion toward China and the U.S.
Since the main objective for Chinese soft power building is to internally
build a stable and unified society, to externally counter the China threat theory
and to improve its national image, my research on the results of China’s soft
power building will mainly focus on foreigners’ perceptions toward China
compared to people’s perceptions toward the U.S. Throughout my research, I
found that attitudes are mainly determined by economic and political situations,
but cultural influence also can be seen. As Chinese culture becomes more popular,
public opinion survey results show that people who have been influenced by
Chinese culture usually have favorable opinions toward China (The Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, 2008).
In general, China has made great progress in the past decade on soft power
building. Since 2003, China’s image has improved internationally, especially in
Asia.
A public survey across the Europe in 2005 showed that 48% of those
polled have favorable feelings toward China, compare to only 25% toward the
U.S. In the U.S., 59% of people have positive feelings toward China, only 24%
believe that China is an economic threat, and only 18% of people worry about a
military threat from China. In another survey, except for Japan and Taiwan,
almost all countries favored China over the U.S.
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Various survey results show an increasing international affinity for China.
According to survey results by the Pew Research Center in June 2005, most of
those in the surveyed areas (Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, Jordan, and
India) regarded the rise of China as positive and believed its economic growth
would benefit their countries. A BBC World Service poll of 22 countries
conducted from November 2004 to January 2005 also showed China as being
viewed positively by most countries, including its neighbors. The percentage of
Asian respondents who viewed China’s global influence as “mainly positive” was
74% in Lebanon, 70% in the Philippines, 68% in Indonesia, 66% in India, and
49% in South Korea (Cho and Jeong, 2008).
According to a multinational public survey done in 2008 by The Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, among six participating countries (U.S., China, Japan,
South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam), 70% to 91% of parents in those five Asian
countries believe it is important for their children to learn Chinese. Compared to
the U.S. score of 7.26 on a scale of 0 to 10, China’s influence has an average
score of 5.72. Though China has not become the most influential cultural power
in Asia, the influence has increased. At the same time, China’s cultural influence
in Asia has been viewed as either “very” or “somewhat” positive. (Figure 5, The
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008)
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In terms of U.S. soft power projection, although the influence is
diminishing worldwide, it is still well regarded among Asian countries. Based on
the Chicago Council survey in 2008, China still lags behind the U.S. in terms of
soft power projection in Asia. Although American overall influence is seen as
declining among six participating countries, “The United States ranks the first in
terms of the appeal of its popular culture in every country but Vietnam.” Also, a
majority of people in Asia view the influence of the U.S. positively (The Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, 2008).
The Chicago survey response indicates a favorable perception toward the
Washington Consensus, the idea of free market and open competition, and many
people still believe that America has the most competitive economy in the world.
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Majorities of 63% to 84% people in China, Japan and South Korea are in favor of
a bilateral free trade agreement with the U.S.
American influence in Asia has strong roots. Since WWII, U.S.
universities have educated several generations of Asian professionals and
elites. American popular culture--movies, music, sports, designer goods-have penetrated deeply into Asian societies. The American democratic
model has inspired many Asian societies as they transitioned from
authoritarian to democratic political systems. The U.S. economy has been
the main export market for Asian producers for many years. American
missionaries have proselytized throughout Asia; Asian tourists continue to
flock to the U.S. (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008).
Almost everyone in Asian countries believes in the importance of learning
English. U.S. universities are also the first choice for students to acquire higher
education, despite costly expenses.
Popular culture from the U.S. is perceived positively in Asia. According to
the results from China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam, most people
agree that American popular culture, like movies, music, cuisine, and clothing,
has a great influence on them. According to Figure 15, on a scale from 0 to 10, the
average score for American influence is 7.26. Except for Muslim Indonesia, 60
percent to 83 percent majorities in each country consider American popular
culture’s influence to be positive.
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Chinese perception of cultural soft power deficits
In recent years, as China develops its economic power and further plays a
responsible role worldwide, majorities of people surveyed believe China will be
the leader of Asia in the future. However, when asked about whether people are
comfortable with this outcome, only majorities in Vietnam say “yes” (The
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008). People who are influenced by Chinese
culture and hold positive views of China’s popular culture show that though
cultural soft power is not overwhelmingly widespread, it is nevertheless effective.
This is one of the reasons why culture is considered an important part of soft
power projection by the Chinese government.
But in recent years, problems with Chinese soft power building have also
emerged. Currently, China’s soft power projection seems to be in a bottleneck or
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stalemate. Because of the Chinese government’s continuing crackdowns on
dissent, despite its countless efforts in portraying itself as a benign and gentle
nation, many foreigners consider China an authoritarian regime. This negative
view is seen in recent poll survey. In an annual BBC World Opinion Poll, the
percentage of people holding positive views about China's rise decreased from
49% in 2005 to 34% in 2010.
Two critical issues have caused this decline. First, media reports about the
Chinese government’s tight controls over almost every aspect of the society, such
as arts, TV, movies, and the press, makes its public diplomacy seem like
projection of political propaganda instead of real cultural, intellectual, and
scientific expressions of the Chinese people. It lacks credibility in the eyes of
outsiders. Second, China's reliance on Confucianism is not an accurate reflection
of Chinese culture and society in the 21st century (Lugar’s report, 2011).
With globalization, cultural clashes or cultural homogenization are
inevitable. America spread its culture and values worldwide via Hollywood
movies and media broadcasts. As more Chinese teenagers grow up eating
McDonald’s, drinking Coke, listening to American pop music, and referring to
democracy in their daily conversations, the Chinese government realizes the
threat of western values and ideology internally. The CCP fears that the U.S. aims
to make American values the mainstream values in developing countries in order
to disseminate democracy and capitalism. Externally, there is a deficit in cultural
exporting. The Chicago survey in 2008 found that official diplomatic influences
are not as strong as portrayed in Chinese newspapers and other media. Only a
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small percentage of people overseas, 9% to 25%, have heard of China’s concept
of a “harmonious world.” Through massive investments, the Communist Party
aims to boost China's soft power and its cultural influence abroad and guide the
Chinese people back to "socialist core values.”
In order to secure socialist ideology and protect Chinese culture, President
Hu brought up the term “cultural security” in his October 2011 speech to Party
members, stating that China and the West are engaging in a cultural war and
“international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of westernizing and
dividing China” (Hu, 2011). He pointed out the China’s cultural power and
influences are not commensurate with China’s international status. President Hu
called for developing Chinese cultural products that meet people’s spiritual
demands and eliminating any forces that would destabilize the Party’s hegemony.
Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping, also pointed out that “China's universities are a key
ideological front to equip our youth with the core values of socialism” (MacLeod,
2012).
The CCP feels threatened by the penetration of foreign cultures, especially
those foreign ideologies and beliefs that may harm the stability of the ruling Party.
Thus, it is important for the government to form a peaceful environment and
protect its legitimacy. Li Shulei, a CPC congress delegate, pointed out back in
2007:
Culture is first and foremost an expression of our souls and emotions, our
spiritual home. But to speak plainly some powerful foreign nations wish to
use culture as a weapon against other nations, and for this reason we must
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work hard to raise our country’s soft power. (Bandurski, 2007)
Some people think this sudden aggressive approach to protect Chinese culture
against western ideology is to avoid another “Arab Spring” revolution in China
spurred by western values of freedom and democracy.
Cai Wu, Minister of Culture, has identified three reasons for the cultural
exporting deficit. First, the government is not exporting, promoting and
presenting enough to the world and most foreigners have a superficial
understanding of China. Second, the current approach only promotes traditional
Chinese culture but neglects contemporary culture. Third, because of the
differences in language and ways of communication, it is difficult to promote
Chinese ways of thinking.
Joseph Nye identified American sources of soft power in an article
published in 2000. According to him, American values are the sources of
American soft power. To some extent, America was considered as the beacon of
freedom, human rights, and democracy. Another source of American soft power is
cultural exports such as movies, TV shows, arts and academic pieces. At the same
time, international institutions and NGOs such as the IMF and the Inter-America
Commission on Human Rights, support values aligned with American interests
and reinforce American soft power building (Nye, 2000).
Compared with sources for American soft power, I believe another aspect
blocking China’s soft power development is China’s shortage of NGOs and
international institutions. In recent years, we have also witnessed China’s
increasing public role in the United Nations, particularly through U.N.
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peacekeeping operations. But People’s University professor Fang Changping
writes that China must “recognize the unique role played by NGOs in cultural
diffusion and exchanges” (Fang, 2007). Yu Xintian, director emeritus of the
Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), also believes that China must
learn to work with international NGOs through the development of domestic
NGOs to improve its soft power (Yu, 2008). China has to build up not only
government-to-government relations with many countries, but also people-topeople interactions through NGOs. However, the political system in China is not
in favor of NGOs, as the Chinese government is wary about such organizations
operating outside its control. In order to fix this, China needs to participate more
in international affairs, create a multinational cooperation system, and play a more
responsible role worldwide.

The U.S. perception of China’s cultural soft power deficit
China’s top leaders are seeking to avoid competition and confrontation
with the West, and especially with the United States. However, some American
scholars and politicians are afraid of China becoming aggressive in its soft power
projection: “As China expands its national power and assumes a bigger role on
the international stage. It is possible that Beijing will promote Chinese socialist
values as an alternative to Western values and seek to assertively promote the
China development model” (Glaser and Murphy, 2009).
Senator Lugar presented a detailed report to the Congress in 2011 on the
comparison of Chinese and American soft power. The report says that Asia has
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overtaken Europe and become the most important region for the U.S. The
American government should give China, the biggest country in Asia, more
attention. After reviewing China's recent efforts on soft power building, including
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai and
Confucius Institutes, the Lugar report concludes that the U.S. is not well prepared
for a rising China and China's prominent role in the world.
Senator Lugar also identified shortages of U.S. soft power projection
from many aspects, as compared to China’s. He pointed out that American public
diplomacy is at disadvantage, as China has been using America’s open system to
build up a vigorous public diplomacy program, while the U.S. government’s
efforts on soft power building in China are suppressed by the Chinese
government. The Chinese government’s Xinhua News agency has opened a new
office located in the New York’s Times Square, while the Chinese government
consistently blocks access to Voice of America in China. At the same time, claims
the report, the U.S. government is not working hard enough to project American
soft power. The U.S. government only established a few American public
diplomacy platforms in China, such as American Centers, American Libraries,
Information Resource Centers, and American Corners, while China has built more
than 70 Confucius Institutes all around the U.S. Compared to the CIs, U.S. efforts
are too small and too few to matter. The 2008 Beijing Olympics was a stunning
success for the Chinese government. The government spent over $44 billion in
order to introduce a modern and open China to the world. Three years later, the
2011 World Expo in Shanghai attracted over 70 million people in six months. The
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Lugar report criticized the American government’s lack of effort in preparing for
the 2011 Shanghai Expos as a squandered opportunity to demonstrate American
technologies and scientific and commercial expertise. In terms of exchange
students, there are only 14,000 American students studying in China, compared to
130,000 Chinese students in the U.S. The Obama Administration has realized this
imbalance and launched the "100,000 Strong Initiative" to encourage more
American students to go to China, aiming to increase the number from 14,000 to
25,000 a year. The results are dismal so far, as few private sector companies and
foundations have been willing to make financial donations.
American scholars warn the government about diminishing U.S. soft
power. Nye pointed out that American foreign policy unilateralism, such as the
rejection of Kyoto Protocol and invasion of Iraq, has damaged American soft
power. The BBC did a survey among 11 countries (including America) in 2003.
Results show that 65% of people think America is arrogant (Nye, 2004).

U.S.- China mutual perceptions:
Chas Freeman, a US diplomat and interpreter for US president Richard
Nixon during his ice-breaking visit to China in 1972, said the official bilateral
relationship, “strong and interdependent as it is, is tinged with a measure of
suspicion, misapprehension, and mistrust," and, despite all the difficulties, the two
sides have "so far managed the necessary adjustments quite well” (Cheng and
Chen, 2012). In addition,
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At the beginning of China's reform and opening-up efforts in
the early 1980s, the US adopted a policy of active engagement
and friendliness toward China. It opened its gates wide to
China and became a nation that was most often talked about
and learned from by the Chinese people. Back then, the
prevalent sentiments of our two peoples toward each other
were friendliness and appreciation. However, after we entered
the 21st century, and as China moves faster in modernization
and gains gradual growth in economy and greater openness in
society, the public opinion in the US toward China somehow
changed: There is more finger-pointing, nit-picking and
mistrust, and the good will our peoples had toward each other
has seemed to have also changed under the influence of the
media. (Cai Wu, 2011)

Even though distrust exists between the U.S. and China, people in both
countries believe that the bilateral U.S.-China relationship is vital to the
development of Asia in the twenty-first century. Two surveys were done during
American Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to China in August 2011. The surveys
were commissioned by China Daily with Gallup in Washington and Horizon
Research Group in Beijing. The surveys include general public and opinion
leaders from both countries, asking about their perceptions of the U.S.-China
relations and the barriers for building closer ties. Among all the respondents, 80%
of Americans and 90% of Chinese respondents emphasize the importance of U.S.-
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China relations, showing an increase compared to similar surveys done
previously. According to the China Daily-Horizon survey done in 2010, the
number of Chinese people believe that the two countries should share a common
responsibility to solve their problems has increased ten percent (Cheng and Chen,
2012).
According to the most recent report by Kenneth G. Lieberthal, director of
the John Thomton China Center, and Wang Jisi, dean of the School of
International Studies, extensive contacts between China and the U.S. have failed
to build mutual trust. On the contrary, many Chinese scholars believe that
America's long-term goal is to undermine the Chinese political system and
constrain China's development, while Americans inherently distrust the Chinese
government's actions and motives. Lieberthal and Wang suggested that both sides
need to discuss in depth the issues they have been avoiding (Lieberthal and Wang,
2012).
Based on a mirror survey of American and Chinese mutual perceptions
conducted by the Committee of 100 in 2007, a majority of businessmen in the
U.S. and China hold favorable opinions toward each other. Compared to the same
survey done in 2005, positive American Congressional view toward China
increased from 19% to 35%. In both countries, younger people hold positive
views of each other.
Despite younger people, businessmen, and congressional viewers’
favorable mutual perceptions, there are serious concerns on both sides. Almost
half of Chinese people surveyed insist that the U.S. is trying to constrian China’s
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rise. According to the China Daily-Horizon Survey in 2011, about 63% of
Chinese respondents said their impression to the U.S. has deteriorated in the past
two years because of the U.S. intervention in Libya and stance on Syria (Cheng
and Chen, 2012). Americans’ feeling toward China deteriorated from 2004 to
2008.
We can see an interesting trend in these public poll results. Younger
people, businessmen, and congressional viewers holding favorable opinions
toward China are those who have interacted with Chinese people and have been
exposed to Chinese culture in one way or another. The impact of cultural soft
power is difficult to measure, but it is certainly one of the factors in shaping
public opinions.
Another interesting finding is that people’s perceptions change quite
frequently, and they are affected by economic and political relations the U.S. has
with China. In 2005, favorability about China in the U.S. decreased, partially
because of media attention on Chinese product safety issues at that time
(Committee of 100 Survey).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Throughout my research, I found increasing attention given to “soft
power” in China in the past two decades. I also found that Chinese scholars have
their own interpretation of soft power that is different from Joseph Nye’s
definition. In 1992, the concept of “soft power,” coined by Joseph Nye, was
introduced to China and generated many discussions. According to Nye, soft
power refers to one’s ability to achieve through attraction rather than coercion.
Chinese scholars’ initial discussions mainly introduced and explained Nye’s
definition. After the Chinese government announced its policy concentrating on
“China’s peaceful rise,” not only scholars but also politicians and the general
public started to pay attention to the concept of soft power. Following the
government’s policy on peaceful rise and harmonious society, the discussion
became more complex. After 2004, Chinese government officials replace the term
“peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) with “peaceful development” (heping fazhan).
In his earlier books, Nye focused the discussion of soft power on popular
culture and political models, and on strategically combining hard power and soft
power (known as “smart power”), aiming to improve international standing and
further expand U.S. values of freedom and democracy. Chinese discussions, on
the other hand, concentrate on developing soft power for different purposes: to
benefit economic development, to counter the negative impressions of China, to
create a beneficial international environment for China’s peaceful development,
and to persuade others to understand and welcome China’s development through
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exporting its traditional culture (Zheng, and Zhang, 2007). China focuses on
developing its economy and building a “harmonious” society through internal
institutional reforms, at the same time calling for a peaceful environment for
“harmonious” development externally. Thus, many Chinese scholars put Chinese
soft power in the context of Chinese society, arguing that the structure and content
of soft power is different from the U.S. and other countries because of diverse
traditions, different civilizations, and various developing paths.
Culture is seen as an important part of soft power projection. Cultural
diplomacy is widely perceived as the influence of one country on another.
Cultural exchange is seen as a platform to achieve national and political purposes.
Liu Zunyi (2004) also emphasized using “appealingness” as the core of soft
power projection, corresponding with an ancient Chinese strategy “win people by
virtue.” Today, the term “soft power with Chinese characteristics” takes Chinese
culture into consideration, referring to soft power projection based on
contemporary Chinese culture. This contemporary culture reflects Chinese
traditional values as well as Marxism, socialism, and some western values related
to technology and education.
Chinese cultural officials have used festival occasions, entertainment and
non-political events to promote exchange and gain influence and to promote
understanding of Chinese culture. Some examples include the 1999 Paris China
Culture week, the 2000 U.S. Tour of Chinese Culture, movie weeks, etc. At the
same time, various organizations and institutions have held dialogues and forums
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to promote soft power projection. Through cultural promotion, China hopes to
assure the world that China is a civilized, responsible and trustworthy nation.
The Chinese government has made culture a top priority in public
diplomacy. Dating back to the very early history of the Chinese Communist Party,
Chairman Mao used culture to spread revolutionary ideology. Today, China has
been opened up for more than thirty years. There has been an important shift from
using culture as a tool for political goals to accepting culture as independent from
politics. A variety of arts and literature have blossomed and once criticized
foreign cultures have been imported to enrich people’s life. However, we can still
feel the Chinese Communist Party’s strong hand over culture to eliminate those
elements that threaten the regime.
Building on scholarly and public discussions of soft power, the Chinese
government turned its attention to cultural soft power building. Two of China’s
most recent presidents emphasized culture development in their reports to the
Party members. In the political report to the 16th Chinese Communists Party
(CCP) Congress on November 8, 2002, former president Jiang Zemin pointed out,
“In today’s world, culture intertwines with politics and economics, demonstrating
a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national
power.” Since taking office in 2003, President Hu Jintao has advocated for a
harmonious world and China’s peaceful development by pursuing soft power in
international relations. China can use its cultural attractiveness to enhance its
national image and counter the “China threat” theory, as well as to ease external
concerns over China’s economic development. President Hu also made this clear
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at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on January 4, 2006:
“The increase in our nation’s international status and influence will have to be
demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and
defense, as well as in soft power such as culture” (Ma, 2007), indicating that soft
power had become a focus of China’s strategic development.
The Chinese government has made great efforts to rebalance cultural
trade deficits. Sponsored by the Chinese government, many Chinese news
agencies and cable and internet broadcasts have been established worldwide, such
as state-owned Xinhua news agency, CCTV 9 and the CNC World. Also, the
2008 Olympic Games, the 2010 Shanghai Expo, and the Confucius Institutes all
indicate China’s efforts to resurge and revive as one of the world’s most
influential countries.
Soft power building is important to the Chinese government for the
following reasons. First, it is a self-defense shield. Soft power projection can
dispel misperceptions and misunderstandings held by foreign commentators over
negative foreign media coverage of events such as the protests in Tibet and the
Olympic torch relay in 2008. Throughout Chinese history, China has never
aggressively battled with other countries, according to Chinese officials, which
underlines the Chinese people’s continuing commitment in harmony and balance.
Thus, soft power development with a focus on culture is the best strategy to
counter the “China threat” thesis. Second, China is looking for a peaceful
environment to facilitate its sustainable development. Third, soft power building
is conducive to the domestic program of building a harmonious society, a concept
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that Hu-Wen’s leadership proposed to tackle mounting domestic social challenges
as well as to maintain the legitimacy of the Party (Li, 2008).
The Chinese definition of soft power inherently includes a domestic
dimension and values of traditional culture like Confucianism. There is a
connection between the Chinese definition of soft power and its efforts of
building and projecting soft power abroad. The Chinese government is conscious
of China’s traditional culture. Chinese traditional culture stresses unity and
stability. Internally, the government needs to use certain elements of traditional
culture to enforce domestic stability. Externally, the government builds on this
domestic dimension to further project China as a non-threatening and benign
country.
The Chinese government exerts cultural soft power through many
approaches. One of the most important is the Confucius Institutes. The concept of
non-threatening soft power is embedded in many ancient Chinese philosophies,
most prominently Confucianism, the tradition of thought and practice associated
with a renowned scholar Kong Fuzi. The doctrine of Confucius includes
obedience, clemency, harmony, mercy, beneficence, benignancy and benignity.
Even though Confucianism has been challenged and rejected several times in
Chinese history, today the Party sees it as the solution to many current social
problems. We see a popular resurgence of Confucianism study among many
Chinese people.
This once criticized ideology has now regained its status and became the
central feature for culture exporting in today’s China for the following reasons.
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First, values advocated by Confucius align with the contemporary Chinese
development mode: harmony and peaceful development. Second, as Marxism and
Communism have become less convincing among Chinese people, Confucianism
fills a philosophical and spiritual void. Third, some Confucius doctrines are
needed in current society to maintain China’s development in a sustainable way.
Fourth, Confucianism is chosen simply because of its popularity and brand
recognition, as China shares the Confucian heritage with many East Asian
neighbors. However, some scholars predict it would be a brief revival. If
Confucianism threatens the legitimacy of Chinese government, it will face
denouncement again. A massive statue of Confucius was erected on the
Tiananmen Square in early 2011 but removed a few months later, implying
ambivalence within the Chinese leadership.
Taking advantage of the resurging popularity of Confucianism, the
Chinese government has established some 350 Confucius Institutes worldwide
since 2004. Modeled after Germany’s Goethe Institute, the UK’s British Council,
and others, the Confucius Institute program is overseen by Office of Chinese
Language Council International (Hanban) affiliated with Ministry of Education in
China. Interested universities must submit applications to Hanban for review. If
approved, Hanban generally provides $100,000 annually, with Chinese teachers
from counterpart Chinese university to start up the institute. Hanban also provides
scholarships for students to study in China. The purposes are to strengthen
educational cooperation, promote the development of Chinese language education
and increase mutual understanding. Six Confucius Institute conferences have been
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held in Beijing to reflect back on the operation and to plan for future
development. From these consistent efforts made by the Chinese government, we
see the importance attached to Chinese soft power building. Challenges have
emerged along the way. Critics warn that the government uses the CIs to have
political control over western universities, and they worry about academic
freedom. People involved in the Confucius Institutes are concerned about the
sustainability of the institutes, in terms of teaching quality and the time span of
people’s interest in Confucianism. I conclude that the Chinese government’s
financial support, the increasing popularity of Chinese language study,
partnerships with universities in China, and CIs’ autonomy and flexibility are the
main reasons for the success and rapid growth of Confucius Institutes.
Poll results show that public opinions toward China are mainly determined
by the economic and political situation, but some cultural influence still can be
seen. In general, China has made significant progress in the past decade on soft
power building. Since 2003, China’s image has been improved internationally,
especially in Asia. Various survey results show increasing international affinity
for China. A causal link between China’s cultural diplomacy and its image abroad
is hard to find. The Chinese government has been using various approaches to
project China’s soft power. There is indeed a difference between projection of
culture and reception of culture. However, without an interest in and acceptance
of Chinese culture, the CIs would not be able to expand so quickly and
successfully. Skepticism exists; therefore, more exchanges are needed to build
better communication.
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However, China’s soft power projection now seems to be at a stalemate.
Because of continuing crackdowns on dissent, despite its countless efforts in
portraying itself as a benign and gentle nation, many foreigners consider China as
an authoritarian regime. Two critical issues cause this negative impression. First,
media reports about the Chinese government’s tight controls over almost every
aspect of the society, such as the arts, TV, movies, and the press, make its public
diplomacy seem like a projection of political propaganda instead of real cultural,
intellectual, and scientific expressions of the Chinese people. It lacks credibility in
the eyes of outsiders. Second, China's reliance on Confucianism is not an accurate
reflection of Chinese culture and society in the 21st century.
Both China and the U.S. realize the importance of soft power building and
the competition they are involved in. The Chinese government feels threatened by
the penetration of foreign cultures, especially those foreign ideologies and beliefs
that may harm the stability of the ruling Communist Party. As mentioned earlier,
the goal of U.S. soft power projection is to encourage American values of
freedom and democracy, whereas China’s goal is to ensure stability and peaceful
development. There is a fundamental clash between values.
Soft power projection is not a zero-sum game. Just because China’s
international influence is increasing, it does not necessarily mean that American
influence in Asia is waning. More connections and understanding can be formed
to build a better future. As Minister of Culture Cai Wu optimistically said during
his speech at the Wilson Center, “China and U.S. have great differences in
culture, but I believe so long as we adhere to the principle of mutual respect and
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seeking common ground in differences, and continuing to deepen our exchange
and communication, China and U.S will definitely reach more consensus in the
future in culture, and particularly achieve more mutual understanding on the
following concept” (Cai, 2011).
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Appendix I: List of Confucius Institutes in USA by Year
2004
University of Maryland: College Park, Maryland
2005
San Francisco State University: San Francisco, California
2006
Bryant University: Smithfield, Rhode Island
Confucius Institute in Chicago: Chicago, Illinois
Confucius Institute at China Institute: New York, New York
University of Hawaii at Manoa: Honolulu, Hawaii
University of Iowa: Iowa City, Iowa
University of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas
University of Massachusetts Boston: Boston, Massachusetts
Michigan State University: East Lansing, Michigan
University of Oklahoma: Norman, Oklahoma
2007
Arizona State University: Tempe, Arizona
University of California Los Angeles: Los Angeles, California
Community College Denver: Denver, Colorado
Confucius Institute in Indianapolis: Indianapolis, Indiana
University of Memphis: Memphis, Tennessee
Miami University: Oxford, Ohio
University of Nebraska-Lincoln: Lincoln, Nebraska
New Mexico State University: Law Cruces, New Mexico
North Carolina State University: Raleigh, North Carolina
University of Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Portland State University: Portland, Oregon
Purdue University: Lafayette, Indiana
University of Rhode Island: Kingston, Rhode Island
Rutgers, the State of University of New Jersey: New Brunswick, New Jersey
University of Texas at Dallas: Richardson, Texas
University of Toledo: Toledo, Ohio
University of Utah: Salt Lake City, Utah
Wayne State University: Detroit, Michigan
2008
University of Akron: Akron, Ohio
University of Arizona: Tucson, Arizona
Confucius Institutes in Atlanta: Atlanta, Georgia
University of Central Arkansas: Conway, Arkansas
Cleveland State University: Cleveland, Ohio
University of Minnesota: Twin Cities, Minnesota
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University of Montana: Missoula, Montana
University of South Carolina: Columbia, South Carolina
University of South Florida: Tampa, Florida
Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, New York
Texas A&M University: College Station, Texas
Troy University: Troy, Alabama
Valparaiso University: Valparaiso, Indiana
Webster University: St. Louis, Missouri
University of Wisconsin-Platteville: Platteville, Wisconsin
2009
University of Alaska Anchorage: Anchorage, Alaska
Alfred University: Alfred, New York
George Mason University: Fairfax, Virginia
Kennesaw State University: Kennesaw, Georgia
University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, Michigan
State University of New York at Binghamton (Confucius Institute of Chinese
Opera): Binghamton, New York
Pace University: New York, New York
Pfeiffer University: Charlotte, North Carolina
Presbyterian College: Clinton, South Carolina
San Diego State University: San Diego, California
Confucius Institute of the State of Washington: Seattle, Washington
2010
University of Chicago: Chicago, Illinois
Columbia University: New York, New York
University of Delaware: Newark, Delaware
Georgia State University: Atlanta, Georgia
University of Kentucky: Lexington, Kentucky
Miami Dade College: Miami, Florida
Middle Tennessee University: Murfreesboro, Tennessee
University of New Hampshire: Durham, New Hampshire
State University of New York at Buffalo: Buffalo, New York
State College of Optometry, State University of New York: New York, New
York
University of Oregon: Eugene, Oregon
Stanford University: Palo Alto, California
University of Texas at San Antonio: San Antonio, Texas
University of Western Kentucky: Bowling Green, Kentucky
2011
Pennsylvania State University: University Park, Pennsylvania
Western Michigan University: Kalamazoo, Michigan
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Summary
Power can be divided into two categories, hard power, referring to military
and economic power, and soft power, indicating the ability to achieve goals
through attraction rather than coercion. Soft power, coined by American scholar
Joseph S. Nye in the early nineties, has been widely used in the academic and
political arenas in recent years.
The purpose of my project is to examine the overall understanding of soft
power among Chinese scholars, politicians, and the public; the projection or
implementation of soft power; and to evaluate the results of China’s soft power
projection in recent years. By thoroughly examining official documents, scholarly
writings, news reports, and various related websites, I came up with several
research questions: how do Chinese scholars interpret soft power? How is it
different from Nye’s definition of soft power? What is soft power with Chinese
characteristics? What is the role of culture in public diplomacy? How does China
wield its soft power? What is the rationale for this enormous attention on soft
power? What are the results of Chinese soft power building? And finally is it a
zero-sum game competing with the U.S. to increase China’s influence, or is the
objective to build better understanding and communication worldwide?
My second chapter titled “soft power in China” discusses Chinese cultural
soft power and a variety of sources for China’s cultural diplomacy. Research
reveals that after Chinese government delivered the idea of China’s peaceful rise,
discussions of soft power became more sophisticated as scholars started to
analyze soft power in the context of China’s current society with China’s peaceful
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rise and development, which also can be termed as “soft power with Chinese
characteristics.” Nye focuses the discussion of soft power on popular culture and
political models, and on strategically combining hard power and soft power
(known as “smart power”) aiming to improve international standing and further
expand U.S. values and assimilate other cultures. Chinese scholars, on the other
hand, concentrate on developing soft power for different purposes which are to
benefit economic development, to counter the negative impressions of China, to
create a beneficial international environment for China’s peaceful rise, and to
persuade others to understand and welcome China’s development through
exporting its traditional culture.
Many scholars believe that culture is an important source of soft power
projection. Cultural exchange bridges mutual understanding and reduces
stereotypes, which leads to better communication and respect between the
cultures involved. There are many approaches through which a country can build
up its cultural soft power. For instance, news and radio channels, satellite TV, the
internet, book publishing, cultural events and performance, worldwide events like
the Olympic games, Chinese learning institutes, students and experts exchange,
academic communication, and tourism.
Following Chinese scholars’ discussion on soft power, Chinese politicians
have used culture as the main source of Chinese soft power building. From the
very beginning of Communist China’s political history, culture and politics have
been closely related. Chairman Mao, during his speech in Yenan back in 1942,
claimed that culture should serve politics. As for today, China has been opened
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up for more than thirty years. A variety of arts and literature are allowed to
blossom and once criticized foreign cultures are imported to enrich people’s life.
However, we can still feel government’s strong hand over culture to eliminate
those elements that threaten the regime.
There has been an increase of conversations within the Party focusing on
soft power. Since taking office in 2003, Hu Jintao, president of People’s Republic
of China, has been advocating for a harmonious world and China’s peaceful rise,
pursuing soft power in international relations. In order to educate foreigners about
China, Chinese government has appropriated 45 billion Yuan (US$7 billion) in
January 2007 to make over its media, establishing Chinese TV, cable and Internet
broadcasts

worldwide,

promoting

Chinese

language

learning,

actively

participating in regional multinational organizations.
Soft power building is important to the Chinese government for the
following reasons. First, internally, soft power building is conducive to the
domestic program of building a harmonious society, a concept that Hu-Wen
leadership proposed to tackle mounting domestic social challenges as well as to
maintain the legitimacy of the Party. Second, it is a self-defense shield. Soft
power projection can dispel misperception and misunderstanding held by foreign
commentators over negative foreign media coverage of events such as the protests
in Tibet and the Olympic torch relay in 2008. Third, with the defensive
approaches mentioned above, China has embarked on a policy of peaceful and
sustainable development that includes culture.
The third chapter of my project analyses Confucianism and uses
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Confucius Institute as a case study of China’s soft power projection. The concept
of soft power is embedded in many ancient Chinese philosophies, most
prominently Confucianism, the tradition of thought and practice associated with a
renowned scholar Kong Fuzi. The doctrine of Confucius includes obedience,
clemency, harmony, mercy, beneficence, benignancy and benignity. Confucianism
since its inception has influenced China for more than 2,500 years. Confucianism
has been denounced many times for different reasons and today it has reentered
Chinese society as a potential solution to many current social problems.
Taking advantage of the resurging popularity of Confucianism, Chinese
government has been establishing Confucius Institutes worldwide since 2004.
Modeled after Germany’s Goethe Institute, UK’s British Council, and others, the
Confucius Institute program is overseen by Office of Chinese Language Council
International (Hanban) affiliated with Ministry of Education in China. Interested
universities must submit applications to Hanban for review. If approved, Hanban
generally provides $100,000 annually with Chinese teachers from counterpart
Chinese university to start up the institute. Hanban also provide scholarships for
students to study in China. The purposes are to strengthen educational
cooperation, to promote the understanding of Chinese culture, to develop of
Chinese language education and increase mutual understanding. According to the
official Hanban website, by the end of year 2011, there were 358 Confucius
Institutes and 500 affiliated Confucius Classrooms established in 96 countries.
Challenges have emerged along the way. Critics warn that government
uses the CIs to have political control over western universities and they worry
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about academic freedom. People involved in the Confucius Institutes are
concerned about the sustainability of the institutes, in terms of teaching quality
and the time span of people’s fever over Confucianism.
Based on the research of Confucius Institutes. In chapter four, I evaluate
the effectiveness of China’s soft power projection by examining people’s opinion
toward China in recent years, also of the U.S.-China mutual perceptions.
Throughout my research, I found that attitudes are mainly determined by
economic and political situations, but cultural influence still also can be seen.
According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008, as Chinese culture
becomes more popular, public opinion survey results show that people who have
been influenced by Chinese culture usually have favorable opinions toward
China. In terms of U.S. soft power projection, although the influence is
diminishing worldwide, it is still well regarded among Asian countries.
In terms of U.S.- China mutual perceptions, even though distrusts exist
between the U.S. and China, people in both countries believe that the bilateral
relationship between U.S.-China is vital in the twenty-first century. However,
extensive contacts between China and the U.S. have failed to build mutual trust.
On the contrary, many Chinese scholars believe that American's long-term goal is
to undermine Chinese political system and constrain China's development, while
American inherently distrusts Chinese government's actions and motives.
We can see an interesting trend in those public poll results. Younger
people, businessman, and congressional viewers holding favorable opinion toward
China are those who have been interacted with Chinese people and have been
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exposed to Chinese culture in one way or another. The impact of cultural soft
power is difficult to measure, but it is certainly one of the factors in shaping
public opinions.
My conclusion sums up previous ideas and estimates the potential
implications for China and the United States.
Chinese definition of soft power inherently includes a domestic dimension
and values of traditional culture like Confucianism. There is a connection between
Chinese definition of soft power and its efforts of building and project soft power
abroad. Chinese government is conscious about China’s traditional culture.
Chinese traditional culture stresses on unity and stability. Internally, the
government needs to use certain elements of traditional culture to enforce
domestic stability. Externally, the government builds on this domestic dimension
to further project China as a non-threatening and benign country.
There is indeed a difference between projection of culture and reception of
culture. However, without an interest in and acceptance of Chinese culture, the
CIs would not be able to expand so fast and successfully. Skepticism exists;
therefore, more exchanges are needed to build better communication.
China’s soft power projection now seems to be in a stalemate. Because of
continuing crackdowns on dissent, despite its countless efforts in portraying itself
as a benign and gentle nation, many foreigners consider China as an authoritarian
regime. Two critical issues cause this negative impression. First, media reports
about Chinese government’s tight controls over almost every aspect of the
society, such as the arts, TV, movies, and the press, makes its public diplomacy
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seem like a projection of political propaganda instead of real cultural, intellectual,
and scientific expressions of the Chinese people. It lacks credibility in the eyes of
outsiders. Second, China's reliance on Confucianism is not an accurate reflection
of Chinese culture and society in the 21th century.
Both China and the U.S. realize the importance of soft power building and
the competition they are involved in. The Chinese government feels threatened by
the penetration of foreign cultures, especially those foreign ideologies and beliefs
that may harm the stability of the ruling Communist Party. As mentioned earlier,
the goal of U.S. soft power projection is to encourage American values of
freedom and democracy, whereas China’s goal is to ensure stability and peaceful
development. There is a fundamental clash between values.
However, soft power projection is not a zero-sum game. Just because
China’s international influence is increasing it does not necessarily mean that
American’s influence in Asia is waning. More connections and understanding can
be formed to build a better future.

